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Abstract: This paper examines the role of the nancial reporting environment
in selecting a new CEO from within versus outside the organization. We show that a
CEOs ability to manipulate performance information renders it more di¢ cult for the
board to detect and replace poorly performing CEOs as well as aggravates incentive
contracting, and these e¤ects are stronger when the new leader is an outsider rather
than an insider. The model generates several predictions. First, boards are more
likely to recruit a CEO from the outside in rms in which performance measures are
harder to manipulate. Second, CEOs recruited from the outside engage in greater
accounting manipulation, receive steeper incentive pay, and obtain higher expected
compensation (rents) than CEOs promoted from within. Third, outside CEOs have
a shorter expected tenure relative to inside CEOs when performance measures are
di¢ cult to manipulate, and the opposite holds true when performance measures are
easy to manipulate.
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1 Introduction
When searching for a new leader, corporate boards face an important question: Should
they promote a new CEO from within the organization or recruit someone from the
outside? Outsiders are typically considered to be more risky than insiders because
corporate boards have less information about outsidersstrengths, experiences, and
leadership style than they have about their own people, and outsiders are less fa-
miliar with the organizations unique culture and inner workings.1 Outsiders can
nevertheless be valuable to the rm because they bring new ideas and fresh perspect-
ives and are generally more open to transformational changes than insiders. One
implication of this argument is that boards tend to promote internal candidates when
the continuation of the current strategy and culture is desirable, but prefer external
candidates when major changes are required (e.g., Zajac 1990; Parrino 1997; Farrell
and Whidbee 2003).2
The notion that bringing in an outsider is more risky than promoting an insider
gives rise to another factor to be relevant for the selection decision the rms n-
ancial reporting environment. Financial reporting plays an important role because
boards use earnings information not only for incentive contracting, but also for as-
sessing how well the new leader matches the needs of the organization and deciding
whether to retain or replace him. We show that incentive problems and the boards
ability to assess and replace poorly performing executives inuence the boards de-
cision over what type of CEO to hire in the rst place. Our model generates new
1See, for example, the discussions in Zajac (1990) and Zhang (2008). See also recent articles on
insider versus outsider succession in the popular press, such as Battley (2012) and Miles (2009).
2Additional factors that inuence CEO selection are the size of the rm (Dalton and Kesner
1983; Guthrie and Datta 1997) and the homogeneity of the industry (Parrino 1997; Zhang and
Rajagopalan 2003). See also Zhang and Rajagopalan (2003) for an overview.
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empirical predictions regarding the determinants of CEO selection and the e¤ects of
this decision on the magnitude of earnings manipulation, optimal contracting, expec-
ted CEO compensation, and the frequency of forced CEO turnover.3
The heightened risks associated with bringing in an outsider does not necessarily
put outside candidates at a disadvantage. As Lazear (1998) and Hermalin (2005)
point out, boards have an option to replace the new hire if he turns out to be the
wrong person for the job and this option has value. Indeed, it is not uncommon
that a CEO is red within the rst two years of his tenure.4 Boards (representing
shareholders) therefore benet from the outsidersupside potential and can protect
themselves from their downside risk by making appropriate subsequent replacement
decisions. However, this argument relies critically on the boards ability to identify
and dismiss poorly performing CEOs.
Empirical evidence by Weisbach (1988) and Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) sug-
gests that the rms nancial reporting system is an important source of information
for assessing and replacing executives.5 The problem is, if CEOs can manipulate the
accounting report, the board may be unable to identify and correct a poor hiring
decision. Consequently, in rms in which CEOs can more easily manipulate per-
formance information (for example, due to weak reporting controls), the probability
of CEO turnover declines and the boards option to replace the incumbent becomes
less valuable. Importantly, we show that the e¤ects of the reporting environment on
3Although we frame our analysis in terms of CEO selection, our results carry over to the more
general question of whether to ll a senior-level job opening with an inside or outside candidate.
4For example, J.C. Penney replaced CEO Ron Johnson after only 17 months on the job. Using
U.S. sample data from 2000 to 2007, Kaplan and Minton (2012) nd an annual CEO turnover rate
of 16.8%, showing that the average CEO stays in control less than 6 years.
5See also Armstrong, Guay, and Weber (2010) and Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) for recent
overviews of research on the role of nancial reporting for corporate governance.
3
CEO turnover and option value are stronger for CEOs hired from the outside than
for those promoted from within. There are two reasons behind this result and both
reasons are driven by the assumption that outsiders have a greater downside risk.
First, the reduced ability to identify and replace unsuccessful CEOs due to distorted
performance information is a bigger problem when the CEO is from the outside, since
outsiders are more likely to fail. Second, as we discuss further below, outside CEOs
have stronger incentives to manipulate the accounting report than inside CEOs, and
the di¤erence in manipulation incentives between the two types of candidates further
increases as reporting controls become weaker. These e¤ects imply that recruiting
a CEO from the outside becomes relatively less attractive than promoting one from
within when the CEO can more easily manipulate the accounting report. In fact, we
show that for su¢ ciently weak reporting controls, the outsiders manipulation incent-
ive exceeds that of the insiders by such a large margin that the risky outsider ends up
being dismissed less often than the insider and also has a smaller ex ante replacement
option value. Thus, the standard textbook result that uncertainty increases option
value can reverse when CEOs are able to manipulate the performance measure on
which the replacement decision is based.
The accounting system a¤ects the desirability of insiders versus outsiders also
through its impact on incentive contracting. To encourage the CEO to take pro-
ductive but personally costly actions, the contract links CEO pay to the accounting
report.6 The outsiders greater downside risk implies that they are less likely to
succeed despite high e¤ort. Relative to inside candidates, the board therefore has
6See also Dye (1988), Feltham and Xie (1994), Dutta and Gigler (2002), Goldman and Slezak
(2006), and Crocker and Slemrod (2007) for models in which the CEOs pay is linked to an interim
performance measure such as earnings. Assuming that the CEO also enjoys private benets from
staying in control does not change our qualitative results.
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to o¤er outside candidates a larger bonus for high reported performance to provide
them with su¢ cient incentives to work hard. When the CEO is unable to manipulate
the report, these two e¤ects higher bonus but smaller probability of obtaining it 
cancel each other out such that the cost of inducing high e¤ort is exactly the same for
outsiders and insiders. This is not the case when the CEO can manipulate the report.
Since outsiders obtain a larger bonus than insiders, they have stronger incentives to
engage in manipulation, which renders it more costly for the board to encourage pro-
ductive actions. As a consequence, CEOs can extract higher rents when they are
recruited from the outside than when they are promoted from within. However, the
disparity between the two candidates with respect to manipulation incentives and
expected compensation declines as reporting controls become stronger and vanishes
when manipulation is prohibitively costly.
These arguments show that, relative to promoting a new CEO from within, ap-
pointing a CEO from the outside has advantages and disadvantages. On the one
hand, outsiders have a higher replacement option value as long as reporting con-
trols are su¢ ciently strong. On the other hand, the e¤ort incentive problem is more
severe for outsiders, which translates into a higher expected compensation (and CEO
rents). As reporting controls improve, the ex ante option value increases, and the
expected compensation decreases for both outside and inside CEOs, but these e¤ects
are stronger for the former than the latter. Thus, a move to stronger reporting con-
trols increases the advantages and decreases the disadvantages of outside candidates
relative to inside candidates, rendering boards more willing to search for a new CEO
outside the rm.
The analysis generates a number of new empirical predictions. First, boards are
more likely to hire outside CEOs in rms or countries with strong reporting regimes
5
than in those with weak regimes. Second, outside CEOs engage in greater levels
of earnings manipulation, receive steeper incentive pay, and obtain higher expected
compensation than inside CEOs and the di¤erence between the two types of can-
didates with respect to manipulation, bonus payments, and expected compensation
is greater when reporting controls are weaker. Third, externally hired CEOs have a
shorter expected tenure relative to internally promoted CEOs if reporting controls
are strong, and the reverse holds if reporting controls are weak.
Other analytical studies on CEO selection include Hermalin (2005), Murphy and
Zábojník (2004; 2007) and Palomino and Peyrache (2013). Murphy and Zábojník
(2004; 2007) argue that changes in the economic environment raise the value of general
managerial skills relative to rm-specic skills, which in turn increases the desirability
of outside CEOs. When competition in the managerial labor market is high, the in-
creased demand for outsiders translates into higher executive compensation. Building
on Murphy and Zábojník (2004; 2007), Palomino and Peyrache (2013) consider a set-
ting in which outsiders have pre-contract private information about their rm-specic
skills, whereas the skills of insiders are commonly known. The additional informa-
tion asymmetry leads to greater expected compensation for CEOs hired externally,
relative to those promoted internally. In contrast, in our setting, the di¤erence in ex-
pected compensation between insiders and outsiders is driven by the e¤ort incentive
problem and the CEOs opportunity to manipulate performance measures. Hermalin
(2005) studies the value of outsiders versus insiders in a setting in which the board
engages in costly information acquisition to uncover the incumbents ability before
making the replacement decision. He demonstrates that outside candidates have an
advantage over inside candidates due to their greater replacement option value. As
discussed above, we show that the value of the replacement option declines when
6
the CEO can distort the performance measure on which the replacement decision is
based and this e¤ect is stronger for outsiders than for insiders. In fact, for su¢ ciently
weak reporting regimes, the more risky outsider no longer has a larger but a smaller
option value than the insider. Our model also di¤ers from Hermalin (2005) in that we
consider optimal incentive contracting. We show that the reporting environment has
a stronger e¤ect on agency frictions when the new CEO is an outsider rather than an
insider. In sum, our paper contributes to the extant literature by studying the e¤ects
of the nancial reporting environment on the desirability of appointing a new CEO
from within versus outside the rm, and by examining how this decision a¤ects the
optimal incentive contract, expected compensation, the magnitude of manipulation,
and the frequency of CEO replacement.
The paper also adds to the literature on CEO turnover, which includes the work
by Cremer (1995), Arya et al. (1998), Almazan and Suarez (2003), Laux (2008),
and Inderst and Mueller (2010). From among these studies, only Arya et al. (1998)
consider how changes in the reporting system a¤ect forced turnover.7 They show that
allowing the manager to destroy earnings information through manipulation can be
optimal because it enables the board to credibly commit not to re the incumbent
at an interim stage. This move can be optimal because it reduces the compensation
required to convince the CEO to join the rm ex ante. In contrast, in our model,
no commitment problem arises. Manipulation is always undesirable because it leads
to both less e¢ cient replacements and higher CEO compensation. In addition, our
study di¤ers from the extant work on turnover because of our focus on the costs and
benets of appointing insider versus outsider CEOs.
7Models that study how the rms information system design a¤ects project termination decisions
include Arya and Glover (2003) and Laux (2014).
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we outline the
model. In Sections 3 and 4, we analyze how the origin of the CEO (insider versus
outsider) a¤ects the optimal contract, the cost of compensation, the level of manip-
ulation, the probability of CEO dismissal, the ex ante value of the option to replace
the incumbent, and how the reporting environment interacts with these e¤ects. In
Section 5, we consider the boards optimal choice of appointing an outsider versus an
insider. We discuss the empirical implications of the model in Section 6 and conclude
in Section 7. All proofs are in Appendix A.
2 The Model
We consider a game with two risk-neutral players: a benevolent board of directors
that acts in the best interest of shareholders, and a CEO.8
Timing: There are three dates. At date 0, the board hires a CEO to run the rm
and o¤ers him an incentive pay plan. After signing the contract, the CEO takes a
personally costly action that increases expected output. At date 1; the CEO privately
observes an accounting signal and issues a potentially distorted report. Based on the
report, the CEO is paid and the board decides whether to replace the incumbent with
a new CEO. Output is realized at date 2; which represents the long-run horizon of
the rm.
CEO selection: At the beginning of the game, the board appoints a CEO either
from inside (n = I) or outside (n = O) the organization. We refer to n as the origin
of the CEO. The new leaders ability to manage the rm is uncertain: He is either a
good t for the position or a bad t. The prior probability that he is a good t is pI
8Assuming that the CEO is risk averse does not a¤ect the main insights of our study. A proof is
available from the authors upon request.
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for an inside candidate and pO for an outside candidate. The probabilities pO and pI
are common knowledge; however, as in Holmstrom (1999), neither the CEO nor the
board initially knows whether he is a good or bad t. A CEO of origin n generates
an output of xn that is either high, xn = xnH ; or low, x
n = xnL; with x
n
H > x
n
L:
To characterize the di¤erences between inside and outside candidates, we make
the following assumptions:
pO < pI  1 and xOH  xIH > xIL  xOL  0: (1)
The rst part, pO < pI ; implies that a CEO hired from the outside is less likely a
good match for the organization than a CEO promoted from within. This assumption
reects the common notion in the academic and popular literature that bringing in
a CEO from the outside involves a greater risk that the new leader will fail.9 The
reason is that corporate boards have less information about the outsiders skills,
competencies, and t than about those of insiders, and there is also uncertainty
about whether outside candidates can successfully transfer their skills to the new
position. In addition, outsiders lack the institutional knowledge that insiders have.
Recruiting a CEO from the outside can nevertheless be attractive to the rm because
outsiders bring new ideas and fresh perspectives and are typically more willing to
take corrective actions and transform the company. Thus, if the outsiders skills and
experiences turn out to match the needs of the organization, he has the potential to
outperform the insider, xOH  xIH . However, if the CEO turns out to be a bad t,
having the outsider in charge is worse (or at least not better) than having the insider
in charge, xIL  xOL  0:10
9See the literature cited in footnote 1.
10In Appendix B, we relax the binary nature of the model and assume that the CEOs ability,
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E¤ort: The CEO chooses an unobservable action, a 2 faL; aHg ; with aH > aL; that
increases the probability of a high output. Action a is associated with a private cost
of k(a) for the CEO, with k(aH) = K and k(aL) = 0: If the CEO is a bad t for the
organization, future output is low with certainty (xn = xnL), regardless of action a. If
the CEO is a good t, output is a function of his action and is high (xn = xnH) with
probability a and low (xn = xnL) with probability (1  a). To avoid trivial solutions,
we focus on parameter constellations for which the board nds it optimal to induce
the high action. This is the case, for example, if xnH is su¢ ciently high.
11 Thus, if an
incumbent with origin n remains in charge (we discuss CEO replacement below), the
expected output is
En = aHp
nxnH + (1  aHpn)xnL: (2)
Accounting report: At date 1, the rms information system generates a signal
s 2 fsL; sHg that reects the economic situation of the rm under the incumbents
continued leadership. The signal is perfectly informative in the sense that s = sH
when the output under the incumbents management is high, xn = xnH ; and s = sL
when it is low, xn = xnL: The CEO privately observes the signal s and issues a
public report r 2 frL; rHg : If the manager does not intervene with the accounting
system, the report is r = rH when s = sH ; and r = rL when s = sL: However, the
CEO can take unobservable manipulative actions, denoted m 2 [0; 1], that distort
the report. Specically, the level of manipulation m represents the probability that
a low signal, s = sL; is misrepresented as good news, r = rH ; and a high signal,
denoted vn; is uniformly distributed between vnL and v
n
H , v
n  U (vnL; vnH) : To capture the increased
uncertainty of outsiders relative to insiders, we assume that the variance is greater under the former
than the latter; that is, vOH > v
I
H > v
I
L > v
O
L : For tractability, we focus on simple incentive contracts
that pay the CEO a xed salary and a bonus if the report lies above a certain threshold. We show
that the qualitative insights of our analysis continue to hold in such a setting.
11For details, see conditions (18) and (19) in Appendix A.
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s = sH ; is misrepresented as bad news, r = rL: As will become clear, the CEO has
an incentive to choose m > 0 only if the accounting signal is low, s = sL. The CEOs
personal cost of manipulation is gm2=2; where the parameter g  0 is exogenous
and represents factors such as the strength of reporting controls, the strictness of
accounting standards, and the quality of legal enforcement. To focus on interior
solutions with m  1, we assume that the manipulation cost g is su¢ ciently high
such that12
g  gmin  2K
pO (aH   aL) : (3)
Contracting: The only variable available for contracting is the accounting report
r.13 After appointing a new CEO of origin n, the board o¤ers a pay plan (wnH ; w
n
L)
where wnH is the bonus for a high report, and w
n
L is the bonus for a low report. Given
action a, the CEOs expected compensation is:
Cn(a) = apnwnH + (1  apn) (mnwnH + (1 mn)wnL) ; (4)
wheremn is the equilibrium level of manipulation chosen by the CEO when observing
a low signal. The CEOs ex ante utility if he delivers action a is therefore
Un(a) = Cn(a)  (1  apn)0:5g (mn)2   k(a): (5)
12We show in Section 3 that the board can (and will) induce productive e¤ort even when the CEO
nds it optimal to choose m = 1 after observing a low signal.
13Similar to the research referenced in footnote 6, we do not consider long-term contracts. A recent
study by Dutta and Fan (2015) examines optimal contracting in a two-period model where CEO
pay can be linked to the rst-period as well as the second-period earnings report and rst-period
earnings management reverses in the second period.
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If the CEO rejects the contract, he can earn a utility of Rn by working elsewhere
(his reservation utility). The participation constraint is therefore given by Un(aH) 
Rn. We assume that the CEOs reservation utility Rn does not exceed aL
(aH aL)K;
and that he is protected by limited liability in the sense that payments must be
non-negative, wnH  0 and wnL  0; for n = I; O.14 These two assumptions are an
important source of contracting frictions in the model. Together with the incentive
constraint, Un(aH)  Un(aL); they imply that the CEO is able to earn an expected
utility that exceeds his reservation level; that is, he enjoys an economic rent. Thus, as
is common in settings with limited liability, the CEOs participation constraint is not
binding (see Appendix A for a proof), and the cost of compensation is determined by
the incentive compatibility constraint.15
CEO replacement: After observing the report r, the board decides whether to
retain or replace the incumbent. If the board hires an alternative CEO, the expected
payo¤ is A; which is the alternates future output net of potential severance payments
to the initial CEO, the cost of employing the alternate, and other turnover related
costs. We assume that A > xIL and A < min

EI ; EO
	
; to ensure that the report is
useful for the replacement decision (in the sense that the board retains the incumbent
if and only if the report is high), as we illustrate next.16
If the accounting report is low, the board knows that output will be low under the
14The term aL(aH aL)K is the CEOs expected utility when g ! 1. For all other g 2 [gmin;1),
the CEOs expected utility is strictly greater than aL(aH aL)K (see Appendix A for a proof).
15Our main qualitative results continue to hold when the reservation utilities are su¢ ciently large
such that the participation constraints for insiders and outsiders are binding. The main di¤erence,
though, is that if one candidate, say the outsider, has a signicantly greater reservation utility than
the other candidate, the insider, then hiring the outsider is (by assumption) relatively more costly
and hence less attractive, which is intuitive. A detailed discussion of these ndings and the proofs
are available from the authors upon request.
16For the analysis it does not matter whether the replacement CEO is an insider or outsider.
12
incumbents continued leadership. In this case, given the assumption A > xIL  xOL ;
the board will nd it optimal to replace the incumbent, regardless of his origin n.
If the accounting report is high, the board is unsure whether the signal is indeed
favorable or whether the manager successfully manipulated it. The expected output
when the incumbent of origin n remains in control is then
P (sH jrH)xnH + (1  P (sH jrH))xnL; (6)
where P (sH jrH) = aHpnaHpn+(1 aHpn)mn and mn is the equilibrium level of manipula-
tion. The assumption min

EI ; EO
	
> A implies that in the absence of any new
information, the board nds it optimal to retain the incumbent. Consequently, when
observing a high report, the board optimally keeps the incumbent in charge; that is,
the term in (6) exceeds A for all mn  1: When the CEO chooses a higher level
of manipulation, a low accounting signal is more likely misreported as high, and the
probability of CEO dismissal declines.
3 Optimal Contract and Manipulation Incentives
In this section, we determine the optimal contract and the CEOs equilibrium ma-
nipulation choice when the board hires a new CEO of origin n. For convenience, we
ignore the superscript n when we refer to an arbitrary CEO and use the superscript
I or O when we refer to a particular CEO.
We start the analysis with the CEOs optimal choice of manipulation. When the
accounting signal is high, the CEO has no reason to manipulate the report because
in the optimal solution wH > wL (see below). When the accounting signal is low, the
13
CEO chooses the level of manipulation, m; that solves
max
m
(m)  mwH + (1 m)wL   0:5gm2: (7)
Taking the rst-order condition for an optimum yields
m = (wH   wL) =g: (8)
The CEOs ex ante utility is a function of the e¤ort level a and is given by
U(a) = apwH + (1  ap)(m)  k(a):
To induce e¤ort a = aH ; the incentive constraint U(aH)  U(aL) must be satised,
which, using (8), can be expressed as
(wH   wL)  K
p (aH   aL) (1  0:5m) : (9)
In the optimal solution, (9) is binding. The wedge (wH   wL) determines the
CEOs e¤ort as well as his manipulation choice, as demonstrated in (8). As the pay
wL increases, the pay wH must increase by the exact same amount to maintain e¤ort
incentives. Thus, an increase in wL has no e¤ect on the level of manipulation but
increases the cost of compensation. The optimal contract therefore sets wL = 0;
which is the lowest possible payment given the limited liability assumption. Solving
the manipulation and e¤ort constraints (8) and (9) leads to the results in the next
proposition.
Proposition 1 The optimal contract, expected compensation, and the level of ma-
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nipulation satisfy
wH =
K
p (aH   aL) (1  0:5m) ; w

L = 0; (10)
C(wH) =
aHK
(aH   aL) + 0:5m
wH (2  aHp) ; (11)
m = 1 
s
1  2K
gp (aH   aL)

: (12)
Recall from Section 2 that we restrict attention to values of g that satisfy g 
gmin =
2K
pO(aH aL) to ensure that the level of manipulation does not exceed one. For
g = gmin; an outside CEO chooses mO = 1 when the accounting signal is low, and the
optimal bonus simplies to wOH =
2K
pO(aH aL) :
17 Although the outsider always obtains
this bonus, the e¤ort incentive constraint (9) is still satised because productive e¤ort
increases the probability that the CEO can avoid the cost of manipulating the report.
As a benchmark assume for the moment that manipulation is prohibitively costly,
g ! 1; such that m ! 0. Since outside candidates are less likely a good t for
the organization than inside candidates, e¤ort has a smaller expected impact on the
success probability for outsiders than for insiders. As a consequence, outsiders must
receive a larger bonus to have su¢ cient incentives to work, wOH =
K
pO(aH aL) > w
I
H =
K
pI(aH aL) ; as conrmed by condition (10). However, this observation does not imply
that outsiders also receive a higher expected compensation. Since outsiders are more
likely to fail, they are less likely to obtain the bonus. Both the larger bonus and
the smaller probability of receiving it cancel each other out such that the expected
compensation and the rent the CEO can enjoy are exactly the same for both types;
CI = CO = aHK
(aH aL) and U
I = UO = aLK
aH aL : Thus, if manipulation is not possible, the
17A CEO appointed from the inside will choose mI < 1 when g = gmin:
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CEOs origin does not a¤ect the severity of the e¤ort control problem and hence the
cost of the incentive system. The next lemma summarizes this benchmark result.
Lemma 1 When manipulation is prohibitively costly g ! 1, outsiders receive a
higher bonus than insiders, wOH > w
I
H ; but expected compensation and CEO rents are
the same for both candidates, CO = CI and UO = U I .
When reporting controls cannot fully prevent manipulation, the cost of the in-
centive system di¤ers for insiders and outsider. To see this, consider rst how the
reporting environment inuences the CEOs level of manipulation. As reporting con-
trols become weaker (g declines), the magnitude of manipulation increases for both
inside and outside candidates, which is intuitive. However, since outsiders receive a
larger bonus for a favorable report, the outsidersmanipulation incentives increase
more quickly than those of insiders. As a result, for any level of g < 1, we obtain
mO > mI , and the disparity between the two candidates with respect to manipulation
(mO  mI) further increases as the cost of manipulation g declines.
Clearly, the reporting environment not only a¤ects the magnitude of manipulation
but also the cost of inducing e¤ort. As g declines, the e¤ort control problem gets
more severe and expected CEO compensation increases. Intuitively, when the CEO
can more easily disguise poor performance through manipulation, he is less eager to
expend productive e¤ort so as to increase the chances of high performance. Since
outsiders have stronger incentives for manipulation than insiders, a move to weaker
reporting controls has a stronger adverse e¤ect on the e¤ort incentive problem for
the former than for the latter. Thus, the cost of the incentive system is higher
for externally hired CEOs than for internally promoted CEOs, CO > CI ; and the
disparity (CO   CI) further increases as reporting controls become weaker. These
ndings are formally stated in the next proposition.
16
Proposition 2 (i) Relative to inside CEOs, outside CEOs obtain a larger bonus,
wOH > w
I
H ; choose a higher level of manipulation, m
O > mI ; and receive a higher
expected compensation, CO > CI :18
(ii) As the marginal cost of manipulation, g, declines, the level of manipulation,
m; the bonus, wH , and the expected compensation, C; increase and these e¤ects are
stronger for outsiders than for insiders:
dmO
dg
<
dmI
dg
< 0;
dwOH
dg
<
dwIH
dg
< 0;
dCO
dg
<
dCI
dg
< 0:
In sum, the analysis shows that the opportunity to manipulate the report has a
greater adverse e¤ect on manipulation incentives and the e¤ort control problem when
the CEO is an outsider rather than an insider. This feature renders outside candidates
less attractive relative to inside candidates. The magnitude of this disadvantage
depends on the strength of the accounting controls. As manipulation becomes harder,
the disparity between the two candidates with respect to manipulation,
 
mO  mI >
0; and expected compensation,
 
CO   CI > 0; declines and eventually disappears.
4 Economic Output and Option Value
Having analyzed the e¤ects of the reporting environment on manipulation and the
cost of executive compensation, we now focus on how the accounting environment
a¤ects the rms expected output. Section 5 then considers both expected output
18The optimal ex ante level of manipulation, denoted mEA, is given by
mEA  (1  aHp) m;
which is the product of the probability that the accounting signal is low, (1  aHp); and the level of
manipulation, m; when the signal is low. Since mO > mI and pO < pI ; we obtain mOEA > m
I
EA:
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and compensation and determines the optimal CEO choice. Expected rm output is
given by
E + Y; (13)
where the term E is the output when the board cannot replace the incumbent (dened
in (2)) and
Y  (1  aHp)(1 m) (A  xL) ; (14)
is the ex ante value of the replacement option. The value of the replacement option
consists of two parts. The rst part
  (1  aHp)(1 m); (15)
is the probability that the report is unfavorable, which triggers the replacement of
the incumbent. The second part, (A  xL) > 0; is the marginal increase in rm value
when the board replaces the incumbent after observing a low report.
Consider again the benchmark in which manipulation is prohibitively costly, g !
1; such that m ! 0. In this case, the board can perfectly identify poorly perform-
ing CEOs and make an appropriate replacement decision. The probability of CEO
dismissal  and the value of the option to replace the incumbent Y are both higher
for external candidates than for internal candidates. This result follows because out-
siders have a greater downside risk than insiders, that is, outsiders are more likely to
end up being the wrong person for the job (pI > pO) and a disappointing outsider
is worse (or at least no better) than a disappointing insider (xIL  xOL ). The next
lemma summarizes this benchmark result.
Lemma 2 When manipulation is prohibitively costly g !1,
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(i) the probability of a low report (r = rL) and, thus, forced CEO turnover is
higher for outsiders than for insiders, O > I ;
(ii) the ex ante value of the replacement option is higher for outsiders than for
insiders, Y O > Y I .
Lemma 2 is consistent with the standard textbook result that uncertainty increases
the value of real options (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). However, the boards ability
to make appropriate replacement decisions depends critically on the accuracy of the
accounting report. In environments with weaker reporting controls (lower g), the
CEO engages in a higher level of manipulation and the board is less likely to identify
and dismiss poorly performing CEOs, which reduces the value of the replacement
option Y . Importantly, the adverse e¤ect of weak reporting controls on the option
value is stronger when the CEO is an outsider rather than an insider. There are
two forces that drive this result: First, the inability to identify and dismiss poorly
performing CEOs due to distorted information is a bigger concern when the CEO is
from the outside since outsiders have a greater downside risk. That is, outsiders are
more likely to be the wrong person for the job and hence are more likely to end up in
a situation where they engage in manipulation, pI > pO; and the cost of retaining a
poorly performing outsider is higher (or at least not lower) than the cost of retaining
a poorly performing insider xIL  xOL : Second, from Proposition 2, weaker reporting
controls increase manipulation incentives faster when the CEO is an outsider rather
than an insider, dmO=dg < dmI=dg < 0: The next proposition summarizes these
results.19
19The results in Proposition 3 hold even when the magnitude of manipulation is exactly the same
for both candidates, mI = mO; such that dmO=dg = dmI=dg < 0: This is the case, for example,
if there is no moral hazard problem (and hence no bonus) but the CEO enjoys private benets of
control when he is retained. See Appendix B for details.
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Proposition 3 When the marginal cost of manipulation, g, decreases, the frequency
of CEO turnover, ; and the ex ante value of the replacement option, Y; decline. Both
of these e¤ects are stronger for outsiders than for insiders:
dO
dg
>
dI
dg
> 0 and
dY O
dg
>
dY I
dg
> 0:
As long as reporting controls are su¢ ciently strong, the frequency of CEO turnover
and the replacement option value are larger for outside candidates than for inside
candidates since outsiders have a greater downside risk (see Lemma 2). However, as
just discussed, the turnover probability and the replacement option value decline as
reporting controls become weaker and these e¤ects are stronger for CEOs hired from
the outside than for those promoted from within. Thus, the advantage of outsiders
relative to insiders in term of option value declines as it becomes easier to manipulate
the performance measure. In fact, we nd that when reporting controls are su¢ ciently
weak, the outsiders manipulation incentive is signicantly stronger than that of the
insider, such that the outsider ends up being dismissed less often than the insider,
O < I ; and also has a smaller ex ante option value, Y O < Y I . Thus, the standard
textbook result that uncertainty increases option value can ip when the cost of
manipulating the report is relatively low. These results are formally stated in the
next proposition.
Proposition 4 There are two unique thresholds, denoted g and gY ; that satisfy g 
gY > gmin; such that relative to inside CEOs:20
(i) outside CEOs are more likely to be dismissed, O > I ; if g > g; and are less
likely to be dismissed, O < I ; if g < g;
20The thresholds are determined in Appendix A. We obtain g > gY if xIL xOL > 0, and g = gY
if xIL   xOL = 0:
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(ii) outside CEOs have a greater replacement option value, Y O > Y I ; if g > gY ; and
have a smaller option value, Y O < Y I ; if g < gY :
In sum, outside candidates have an advantage relative to inside candidates in
terms of higher option values but only if the reporting controls are relatively strong.
As it becomes easier to manipulate the performance measure, the relative advantage
declines and, for su¢ ciently weak reporting controls, the result ips and insiders have
a greater option value than outsiders.
5 Insider versus Outsider
We are now ready to study the conditions under which the board prefers an outside
candidate over an inside candidate. Expected rm value is the di¤erence of the
expected output given in (13) and the cost of CEO compensation C(g) given in (11):
V = E + Y (g)  C(g): (16)
Shareholders prefer the external candidate over the internal candidate if and only
if V O  V I ; which can be rewritten in terms of the outsiders output potential:
xOH  bxOH  EI +  Y I   Y O   CI   CO  (1  aHpO)xOLaHpO : (17)
Holding xIH ; x
I
L; and x
O
L constant, there exists a threshold, denoted bxOH ; such that
appointing the outsider is optimal if xOH  bxOH and appointing the insider is optimal
if xOH < bxOH .
The outside candidate becomes relatively more attractive, and hence has to clear
a lower hurdle bxOH ; when manipulating the report becomes more costly (g increases).
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The reason for this result is twofold. First, the outsider has a disadvantage relat-
ive to the insider because contracting frictions lead to pay di¤erences between the
two candidates, CO > CI (Proposition 2). However, the magnitude of this relative
disadvantage, CO   CI ; declines as reporting controls become stronger and vanishes
(CO   CI) ! 0 when g ! 1: Second, as long as reporting controls are su¢ ciently
strong, the outsider has an advantage relative to the insider because he has a greater
replacement option value (Proposition 4). This advantage further increases when the
accounting report is more di¢ cult to manipulate. These e¤ects reinforce each other
and imply that outsiders become more desirable relative to insiders when reporting
controls are stronger. The next proposition conrms this intuition.
Proposition 5 Holding xIH ; x
I
L; and x
O
L constant, there is a threshold bxOH such that
the board hires the outsider if xOH  bxOH ; and the insider if xOH < bxOH : The outsider
becomes more attractive  that is, the hurdle bxOH decreases as the marginal cost of
manipulation, g, increases.
6 Empirical Implications
Determinants of CEO selection. A number of empirical studies have looked at
factors that are associated with the selection of insider versus outsider CEOs. For
example, evidence suggests that boards are more likely to recruit CEOs from the
outside when changes in the direction of the rm are desirable (Parrino 1997; Farrell
and Whidbee 2003), when the industry is more homogenous (Parrino 1997; Zhang
and Rajagopalan 2003), when the proportion of outside directors sitting on the board
is greater (Borokhovich et al. 1996), and when the rm is smaller (Dalton and Kesner
1983; Guthrie and Datta 1997). Our model o¤ers another factor that can contribute
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to the CEO selection choice: the rms nancial reporting environment. Financial
reporting plays an important role because the board relies on accounting information
for incentive contracting as well as for deciding whether to replace or retain the
incumbent. Stronger reporting controls make it harder to manipulate performance
information, which increases the boards ability to assess executives and replace them
if necessary. The boards ability to detect and undue a poor hiring decision, in turn,
increases its willingness to take risks by appointing an outside candidate. The model
therefore predicts that boards are more likely to recruit a CEO from the outside
when the performance measures with which the new leader is assessed are harder to
manipulate. The CEOs cost of manipulating nancial reporting is likely to di¤er from
country to country due to di¤erences in accounting standards and legal enforcement.
The model therefore suggests a higher percentage of outsider CEOs in countries in
which it is harder to manipulate accounting information due to stricter accounting
standards and stronger legal enforcement.
E¤ects of CEO selection. Our second set of predictions relates CEO origin (insider
versus outsider) to accounting manipulation and CEO compensation. Specically, the
model predicts that CEOs appointed from the outside (i) engage in higher levels of
manipulation, (ii) obtain steeper incentive pay, and (iii) receive greater expected com-
pensation than those promoted from within. The prediction that CEO compensation
is greater for outsiders than for insiders is consistent with empirical evidence by Harris
and Helfat (1997) and Murphy and Zábojník (2007). To the best of our knowledge,
the other two predictions have not yet been tested. Given the many potential ex-
planations for why outsiders receive higher compensation than insiders, our third set
of predictions can help to distinguish our theory from alternative explanations. Our
model predicts that the di¤erences in terms of manipulation, the size of the bonus,
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and expected compensation between insiders and outsiders are greater in environ-
ments in which managers can more easily manipulate performance information than
in those in which manipulation is more di¢ cult.
Our model also relates the origin of the CEO to the likelihood of early dismissal.
Specically, the model predicts that, as long as reporting controls are su¢ ciently
strong, externally recruited CEOs have a shorter expected tenure than internally
promoted CEOs. This relation becomes stronger when the cost of manipulation fur-
ther increases. In contrast, when reporting controls are relatively weak, the model
suggests that outsiders have a longer expected tenure than insiders. Shen and Can-
nella (2002) and Zhang (2008) provide empirical evidence that outside CEOs are more
likely to be dismissed, and thus have a shorter tenure than inside CEOs. This nding
is not inconsistent with our model because these studies do not distinguish between
rms with weak and strong reporting controls. A test of our model therefore requires
the partitioning of the data into rms with strong reporting controls, where the ef-
fects documented by Shen and Cannella (2002) and Zhang (2008) should be strong,
and rms with weak reporting controls, where the e¤ects should be weaker or even
reversed.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how the nancial reporting environment a¤ects the benets
and costs of appointing a new CEO from within versus outside the organization.
Although we frame our analysis in terms of CEO selection, the results carry over to the
more general question of whether to ll a senior-level job opening (e.g., department
or store manager, vice president, college dean) by hiring externally or promoting
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internally. Going outside is typically viewed as more risky because employers know
less about external candidates than they do about their own people. As Lazear
(1998) points out, the uncertainty about outsiders abilities provides option value
because employers can dismiss a new hire who turns out to be a poor match for
the organization. However, for this argument to hold, superiors need to be able to
accurately assess the new hires performance. We show that when managers can
manipulate the measures with which their performance is assessed, the standard real
option view does not necessarily hold, and the more risky outsider can end up having
a lower, not higher, replacement option value.
Our model generates a number of new empirical predictions. First, managers
recruited from the outside receive steeper incentive pay, obtain higher expected com-
pensation (rents), and engage in greater levels of manipulation than those promoted
from within. Outsiders therefore have a disadvantage relative to insiders in terms
of higher manipulation incentives and compensation costs, but this disadvantage is
smaller when performance measures are harder to manipulate. Second, externally
hired managers have a shorter expected tenure relative to those promoted internally
when performance measures are di¢ cult to manipulate, and the opposite holds when
performance measures can easily be manipulated. Finally, the model predicts that
rms are more likely to ll an empty position with an outsider when the measures
with which the new hire is assessed are harder to manipulate.
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8 Appendix A - Proofs
Conditions for which inducing high e¤ort is optimal.
In this appendix, we derive the conditions under which the board prefers to induce
high e¤ort, aH ; rather than low e¤ort, aL:When the board implements aH , rm value
is given by (see (16)):
V (aH) = E + Y (g)  C(g):
When the board implements aL, the optimal contract is wH = wL = 0, and the
CEO does not engage in manipulation, m = 0. Firm value is then given by
V (aL) = aLpxH + (1  aLp)A.
Inducing e¤ort is optimal if V (aH)  V (aL): Note that V (aH) is increasing in g
because we know from Propositions 2 and 3 that dC=dg < 0 and dY=dg > 0: However,
V (aL) is independent of g.
To focus on interior solutions with m  1; we assume that g  gmin  2KpO(aH aL)
(which is condition (3) in Section 2). If V (aH)  V (aL) is satised for g = gmin;
V (aH)  V (aL) is satised for all g  gmin:
Consider rst an outsider CEO. For g = gmin, we obtain mO = 1; and
CO(gmin) =
2K
pO (aH   aL) and Y
O(gmin) = 0:
Consequently, for g = gmin; V O(aH)  V O(aL) is satised if EO  2KpO(aH aL)  V O(aL);
which, after some rearranging, leads to
xOH  xOmin 
(1  aHpO)
 
A  xOL

+ 2K
pO(aH aL)
(aH   aL) pO + A: (18)
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Consider now an insider CEO. For g = gmin, we obtain mI = 1 
r
1  pO
pI

< 1:
V I(aH)  V I(aL) is satised if EI + Y (gmin)  C(gmin)  V O(aL); which, after some
rearranging, yields
xIH  xImin 
(1  aHpI)
 
A  xIL

+ CI(gmin)  Y I(gmin)
(aH   aL) pI + A: (19)
Given CI(gmin) < CO(gmin) = 2KpO(aH aL) ; from Proposition 2, Y
I(gmin) > 0; p
I > pO;
and xIL  xOL ; we obtain xImin < xOmin: Thus, as long as conditions (18) and (19) are
satised, the board nds it optimal to provide e¤ort incentives to both insiders and
outsiders.
Proof of Lemma 1.
When g !1; we obtain m! 0: Substituting m = 0 into (10), (11), and (5) gives
wH =
K
p (aH   aL) ; C =
aHK
(aH   aL) ; and U =
aLK
(aH   aL) :
Since pI > pO, it follows that wOH > w
I
H .
Proof of Proposition 2.
Part (i). Given pO < pI ; (12) implies mO > mI : Given pO < pI and mO > mI ; (10)
implies wOH > w
I
H :
Substituting wL = 0 and a = aH into the compensation cost function (4), yields
C = (aHp+ (1  aHp)m)wH : (20)
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Using the incentive constraint, U(aH) = U(aL); we can write the bonus as
wH(m; g) =

K
p(aH aL)   0:5gm2

(1 m) : (21)
Using (21) and (8) we obtain
C = aH
K
(aH   aL) + 0:5gm
2 (2  aHp) ; (22)
and hence
CO   CI = 0:5g
 
mO
2  
2  aHpO
   mI2  2  aHpI > 0; (23)
which is positive due to pO < pI and mO > mI :
Part (ii). Taking the rst derivative of (21) yields
dwH(m; g)
dg
=
@wH(m; g)
@g
+
dm
dg
@wH(m; g)
@m
=
 0:5m2
(1 m) < 0; (24)
because @wH(m;g)
@m
= wH(m;g) gm
(1 m) = 0 due to condition (8). Given that m
O > mI ; (24)
implies dw
O
H
dg
<
dwIH
dg
< 0:
Using (8) we obtain
dm
dg
=  wH
g2
+
dwH
dg
1
g
: (25)
Given that dw
O
H
dg
<
dwIH
dg
< 0 (as just established) and wOH > w
I
H ; (25) implies
dmO
dg
<
dmI
dg
< 0:
Taking the rst derivative of (20) yields
dC
dg
= (aHp+ (1  aHp)m) dwH
dg
+ (1  aHp)dm
dg
wH < 0; (26)
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which is negative because dwH
dg
< 0 and dm
dg
< 0. Using (21) and (12), we can write
(26) as
dC
dg
=
dm
dg
wH

2  aHp
2 m

: (27)
Condition (27) implies dC
O
dg
< dC
I
dg
< 0 because pI > pO; dm
O
dg
< dm
I
dg
< 0 (as just
established), mO > mI ; and wOH > w
I
H .
Proof of Proposition 3.
Using (15) we obtain
d
dg
=   (1  aHp) dm
dg
> 0;
which is positive because dm
dg
< 0. Further, since dm
O
dg
< dm
I
dg
< 0 from Proposition 2
and
 
1  aHpO

>
 
1  aHpI

, we obtain d
O
dg
> d
I
dg
> 0:
Similarly, using (14) we obtain
dY
dg
=   (1  aHp) dm
dg
(A  xL) > 0;
which is positive because dm
dg
< 0. Further, since dm
O
dg
< dm
I
dg
< 0 from Proposition 2, 
1  aHpO

>
 
1  aHpI

, and
 
A  xOL
   A  xIL, we obtain dY Odg > dY Idg > 0:
Proof of Proposition 4.
Using (15), the outsider is more likely to be dismissed than the insider if and only if
I = (1  aHpI)(1 mI) < O = (1  aHpO)(1 mO): (28)
Substituting (12) into (28), yields after some rearranging
g > g 
 
pI(1  aHpO)2   pO(1  aHpI)2

2K
((1  aHpO)2   (1  aHpI)2) (aH   aL)pOpI .
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Given pI > pO; direct computations show that g > gmin = 2KpO(aH aL) (gmin is
the lowest level of g as discussed in Section 2): Thus, for all g 2 [gmin; g) we obtain
I > O and for all g 2 (g;1) we obtain I < O.
Using (14), the outsider has a greater option value than the insider if and only if
Y I = (1  aHpI)(1 mI)(A  xIL) (29)
< Y O = (1  aHpO)(1 mI)(A  xOL ):
Substituting (12) into (29) yields after some rearranging:
g > gY 
 
pI(1  aHpO)2(A  xOL )2   pO(1  aHpI)2(A  xIL)2

2K
((1  aHpO)2(A  xOL )2   (1  aHpI)2(A  xIL)2) (aH   aL)pOpI
.
Given pI > pO; direct computations show that gY > gmin = 2KpO(aH aL) : Thus, for all
g 2 [gmin; gY ), we obtain Y O < Y I and for all g 2 (gY ;1), we obtain Y O > Y I .
Further, direct computations show that g > gY if xIL   xOL > 0, and g = gY if
xIL   xOL = 0:
Proof of Proposition 5.
Using (17), we obtain
dbxO
dg
=

dY I
dg
  dY O
dg

 

dCI
dg
  dCO
dg

aHpO
< 0;
which is negative because dY
O
dg
> dY
I
dg
> 0 from Proposition 3 and dC
O
dg
< dC
I
dg
< 0
from Proposition 2.
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Participation constraint is non-binding.
We now prove that the incentive constraint, U(aH)  U(aL); implies satisfaction of
the participation constraint, U(aH)  R; if the CEOs reservation utility R does not
exceed aL
(aH aL)K. In this case, the participation constraint is non-binding and the
expected compensation is determined by the incentive constraint, allowing the CEO
to enjoy an economic rent (that is, a utility that exceeds his reservation utility). We
start the analysis by determining the CEOs utility given the optimal contract in
Proposition 1. The CEO receives an expected utility of
U(aH) = C   (1  aHp)0:5gm2  K; (30)
which, after substitution of (22), can be written as
U(aH) =
aL
(aH   aL)K + 0:5gm
2: (31)
Condition (31) shows that UO > U I > 0 since mO > mI from Proposition 2.
Taking the rst derivative of (31) with respect to g; and using (12), yields
dU(aH)
dg
=  0:5 m
2
(1 m) < 0: (32)
Condition (32) implies dU
O
dg
< dU
I
dg
< 0 because mO > mI from Proposition 2.
Since the CEOs utility declines with g, his utility is minimized when g ! 1,
which implies m = 0: In this case, the bonus for success, given in (10), and the CEOs
expected utility, given in (31), simplify to
wH =
K
p (aH   aL) and U(aH) =
aL
(aH   aL)K:
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Recall from assumption (3) that we focus on values of g that satisfy g  gmin 
2K
pO(aH aL) to ensure an interior solution for m. The CEOs utility is therefore maxim-
ized when g = gmin: In this case, the outsider chooses mO = 1 and the insider chooses
mI =

1 
q
pI pO
pI

(see (12)), and their utilities (31) simplify to
UO(aH) = U
O
max 
K
(aH   aL)

aL +
1
pO

; (33)
and
U I(aH) = U
I
max 
K
(aH   aL)
0@aL + 1
pO
 
1 
s
1  p
O
pI
!21A ; (34)
respectively. This establishes that the CEOs participation constraint is non-binding
for all g 2 [gmin;1) as long as his reservation utility does not exceed aL(aH aL)K.
9 Appendix B - Continuous CEO Ability and Out-
put
In this Appendix, we relax the assumptions that output, CEO ability, and the report
are binary and show that the key forces developed in the main body of the paper
continue to hold. In particular, we consider a setting with the following modications.
A CEO of origin n has an ability of vn; which is uniformly distributed between vnL
and vnH , v
n  U (vnL; vnH) : As in Hermalin (2005), the expected output equals the
CEOs ability vn if the CEO stays in charge. To capture the increased uncertainty
of outsiders, we assume that vOH > v
I
H > v
I
L > v
O
L so that the variance of the output
generated by an outsider is greater than that of an insider. The ex ante expected
ability of a CEO is  = (vnH + v
n
L)=2 regardless of whether he is an insider or outsider
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and regardless of whether he is hired at date 0 or date 1. However, replacing the
incumbent at date 1 involves a cost of  > 0 for the rm such that CEO turnover
leads to an expected payo¤ of A  (   ). Thus, it is rst-best optimal to replace
the incumbent if and only if vn < A: As in the main text, we ignore the superscript
n when we refer to an arbitrary incumbent and use the superscript I or O when we
refer to a particular incumbent.
For simplicity, we abstract away from e¤ort control problems for now and assume
that the CEO enjoys a private benet of control B > 0 if he remains in charge until
date 2. We extend this setting further below to introduce moral hazard concerns.
After the CEO privately observes v; he chooses to engage in manipulation m 2 [0; 1]
at a personal cost of 0:5gm2: To ensure that the level of manipulation does not exceed
1, we assume that g  B. With probability m, the CEO overrides the accounting
system and can choose any report r, and with probability (1 m), the report r must
be truthful, r = v: Similar to our original model, manipulation is detrimental because
it increases the probability that low-ability CEOs remain in charge.21
An equilibrium consists of action choices for the CEO and the board such that:
(i) given the CEOs manipulation strategy and given the observed report r, the
board replaces the incumbent if and only if the expected output under the incumbents
management lies below A;
(ii) given the boards replacement strategy and the CEOs private information
about v, the CEO makes a manipulation decision that maximizes his expected payo¤.
We focus on equilibria with pure strategies. If there exists an equilibrium (we
21If we assumed instead that manipulation results in a biased report of the form r = v +m; the
board can perfectly infer the true ability v from the report. In such an environment, the CEOs
manipulation does not mislead the board and hence does not distort the CEO turnover decision.
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establish existence below), the equilibrium is such that the board replaces the in-
cumbent if and only if the CEOs report r is below a replacement threshold, denoted
vRT , with vRT = A. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists a report
r = vU 2 (A; vH) such that the board nds it optimal to dismiss the CEO when
r = vU . Thus, if the CEOs manipulation is successful (with probability m), the
CEO will not report r = vU ; implying that r = vU must be truthful. Since vU > A;
the board optimally retains the incumbent for r = vU ; which contradicts the initial
strategy to dismiss him. Suppose now that there exists a report r = vD 2 (vL; A) such
that that the board nds it optimal to retain the incumbent when r = vD. The CEO
will then optimally not manipulate the report when he observes v = vD and when
he observes v 2 (vL; A) ; v 6= vD he may report r = vD if manipulation is successful.
This implies that the report r = vD may be truthful or may have been manipulated,
but the expected output conditional on the report r = vD is always lower than vA.
The board therefore optimally dismisses the CEO when r = vD; which contradicts
the initial strategy to retain him.
Given the boards replacement strategy, the CEO chooses m = 0 if he observes
v  A and chooses the level of m that maximizes mB  0:5gm2 if he observes v < A:
Since the benet B is the same for insiders and outsiders, we obtainmO = mI = B=g:
Further, to satisfy condition (i) that the expected output conditional on the report
r  A is greater than A, a CEO who successfully manipulates the accounting system
(with probability m) randomly issues a report that lies in the range (bv; vH) ; where bv
is dened by:
bv  (vH + A) 
q
(vH   A)2   2 (A  vL)2
2
: (35)
To ensure that the square root term in (35) is nonnegative, we assume that the
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replacement cost is not too low, that is,    min 

  vOH+
p
2vOL
1+
p
2

. Note that
rearranging condition (35) shows that bv > A:
The CEOs misreporting strategy to randomly issue a report that lies in the range
(bv; vH) ensures that the board will indeed nd it optimal to retain the incumbent
when the CEOs report exceeds or equals A: Intuitively, given the CEOs reporting
strategy, a report that lies in the range (A; bv) is truthful and the board optimally
retains the incumbent (note that bv > A). When the report lies in the range (bv; vH),
the board knows that the report might have been manipulated and updates its beliefs
about the incumbents expected ability. The value bv in expression (35) ensures that,
conditional on observing the report r 2 (bv; vH); the expected ability of the incumbent
is greater than A such that it is optimal to retain him. To prove this result, note
that the CEOs expected ability given the report r is strictly increasing in r. Thus,
to show that retaining the incumbent is optimal for all r 2 (bv; vH), it su¢ ces to show
that the CEOs expected ability is greater than A if r = bv:
E [vjr 2 (bv; bv + ")] =

"
vH vL
  bv+bv+"
2

+m

A vL
vH vL

"
vH bv
  
vL+A
2

"
vH vL

+m

A vL
vH vL

"
vH bv

=
 bv+bv+"
2

+m

A vL
vH bv
  
vL+A
2

1 +m

A vL
vH bv
 >  bv+bv+"2 +

A vL
vH bv
  
vL+A
2

1 +

A vL
vH bv
 ;
lim
"!0
E [vjr 2 (bv; bv + ")] > bv +

A vL
vH bv
  
vL+A
2

1 +

A vL
vH bv
 . (36)
35
Substituting (35) into (36), we obtain
lim
"!0
E [vjr 2 (bv; bv + ")] > A.
Note that the CEOs strategy to send a report that lies in the range (bv; vH) is not
the only possible equilibrium strategy but it is a relatively simple one. To elaborate,
one might wonder why the CEO does not pursue an even simpler misreporting strategy
such as (i) randomly sending a report that lies in the range [A; vH ] or (ii) always
sending the highest possible report r = vH : The problem is that in both cases the
board would no longer nd it optimal to retain the incumbent for all r 2 [A; vH ]:
Specically, in case (i), the board would prefer to re a CEO who sends a report
that only marginally exceeds A (that is, r = A + "; with " being small) because if
the report is unmanipulated the incumbents ability is only marginally higher than
the replacements ability, but if the report has been manipulated, the incumbents
expected ability is much lower than the replacements ability. In case of (ii), the board
knows that a report r = vH has most likely been manipulated such that it optimally
replaces the incumbent.
In sum, if    min; there exists an equilibrium in which the board replaces
the CEO if and only if r  A and the CEO chooses m = 0 if he observes v  A
and chooses the level of m that maximizes mB   0:5gm2 if he observes v < A: If
manipulation is successful, the CEO randomly issues a report that lies in the range
(bv; vH) ; where bv is dened in (35) and satises bv > A.
Dismissal and option value: Given the CEOs and the boards strategies, the
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probability of CEO dismissal and the value of the replacement option are
  (1 m) Pr(v < A) and (37)
Y  (1 m) Pr(v < A) (A  E (vjv < A)) ; (38)
respectively, where mO = mI = B=g: Since outsiders have a greater downside risk
than insiders (vOH   vOL > vIH   vIL and vOL < vIL); an outsider is more likely to have an
ability below A, that is,
Pr(vO < A) > Pr(vI < A); (39)
where Pr(v < A) = A vL
vH vL = 0:5  
 
vH vL : Clearly, condition (39) implies that the
turnover probability is higher when the incumbent is an outsider rather than an
insider, O > I . Further, due to the higher downside risk of outsiders, the average
ability of a dismissed outsider is lower than the average ability of a dismissed insider,
that is,
E
 
vOjvO < A < E  vI jvI < A ; (40)
where E (vjv < A) = vL+A
2
: Conditions (39) and (40) now imply that the value of the
replacement option is higher for outsiders than for insiders, Y O > Y I .
As reporting controls improve (g increases), the board is more likely to identify
disappointing CEOs, which increases both the frequency of CEO turnover, , and the
value of the replacement option, Y . Using (37) and (38) we obtain
d
dg
=  Pr(v < A)dm
dg
> 0; and
dY
dg
=  Pr(v < A)dm
dg
(A  E (vjv < A)) > 0:
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Given (39) and (40), these e¤ects are both stronger for outsiders than for insiders:
dO
dg
>
dI
dg
> 0 and
dY O
dg
>
dY I
dg
> 0: (41)
As a consequence, outsiders become more attractive relative to insiders when it is
harder to manipulate the report.
E¤ort: We now extend the analysis by assuming that the expected output generated
by the CEO is a function of his ability and e¤ort. If the CEO works hard, output v
follows the uniform distribution outlined above, but if he shirks, output is uniformly
distributed between vL and A; implying that a shirking CEO should be replaced.
The CEOs personal cost of working is K > 0 and the cost of shirking is zero. We
assume that K is su¢ ciently small such that the board nds it optimal to induce
e¤ort. Similar to the base model we assume here that the manager does not receive
any private benets of control.
We focus on simple incentive contracts that pay the CEO a xed salary, denoted
F , and a bonus, denoted b, if the report r lies above a certain threshold, denoted
vBT : In a proof that is available upon request, we show that the optimal xed salary
is F = 0 and the optimal bonus threshold is vBT = A:
The boards and the CEOs equilibrium strategies are similar to the case with
private benets. The only di¤erence is that the level of manipulation is now determ-
ined by m = b=g; where b is an endogenous bonus (rather than an exogenous private
benet of control). Since the bonus b will di¤er for insiders and outsiders, so will m.
To implement e¤ort, b has to be su¢ ciently high to satisfy the incentive constraint
Pr(v < A)
 
mb  0:5gm2+ (1  Pr(v < A))b K   mb  0:5gm2 :
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The optimal bonus, the level of manipulation, and the expected compensation are
characterized by:
b =
K
(1  Pr(v < A)) (1  0:5m) ;
m =
 
1 
s
1  2K
g (1  Pr(v < A))
!
;
C = (Pr(v < A)mb+ (1  Pr(v < A))b)
=

1 + Pr(v<A)
(1 Pr(v<A))m

(1  0:5m) K:
To ensure that mO  1 we assume g  gmin  2K(1 Pr(vO<A)) , similar to the base
model (note that g  gmin also implies mI < 1). Taking the rst derivative of b, m;
and C with respect to g yields
db
dg
=
0:5dm
dg
K
(1  Pr(v < A)) (1  0:5m)2 < 0;
dm
dg
=  0:5
2K
g2(1 Pr(v<A))r
1  2K
g(1 Pr(v<A))
 < 0;
dC
dg
=
dm
dg
 Pr(v<A)
(1 Pr(v<A)) + 0:5
(1  0:5m)2
!
K < 0;
Given (39), we obtain
mO > mI ; bO > bI ; CO > CI ; and (42)
dmO
dg
<
dmI
dg
< 0;
dbO
dg
<
dbI
dg
< 0;
dCO
dg
<
dCI
dg
< 0: (43)
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These results replicate the results presented in Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 in the
main body of the paper.
Further, the discrepancy in manipulation incentives, mO > mI ; reinforces the
results in (41) and we continue to obtain:
dO
dg
>
dI
dg
> 0 and
dY O
dg
>
dY I
dg
> 0: (44)
Since dm
O
dg
< dm
I
dg
< 0 there are two threshold levels, denoted g and gY ; such that
O > I and Y O > Y I for all g > g and g > gY ; respectively, and O < I and
Y O < Y I for all g < g and g < gY ; respectively. These results replicate the results
in Lemma 2 and Propositions 3 and 4 in the main body of the paper.
The expected rm value is now V = + Y   C and the board hires the outsider
if and only if
V O = + Y O   CO  V I = + Y I   CI :
Since
dCO
dg
<
dCI
dg
< 0;
dY O
dg
>
dY I
dg
> 0;
CO(gmin) > C
I(gmin); C
I(g !1) = CO(g !1) = K;
Y O(g ! 1) > Y I(g !1); Y O(gmin) = 0 < Y I(gmin);
there is an interior threshold, bg; such that the board optimally hires the outsider if
manipulation is costly, g > bg, and optimally promotes the insider otherwise. Although
this result is presented in a slightly di¤erent fashion than the result in Proposition 5,
its implication that the board is more likely to promote an outsider as g increases
is the same.
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